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1 Introduction
There is considerable evidence which show that countries have repeatedly
defaulted on their external obligations (Reinhart and Rogo¤, 2009). What
are the common features associated with default on sovereign debts? On sev-
eral occasions, debt rescheduling or negotiated partial default often involve
a reduction of interest rates, if not principal, and typically saddle creditors
with illiquid assets that may not pay o¤ for an extended period of time
(Reinhart and Rogo¤, 2009). Illiquidity and reduction in debt repayment,
two striking aspects of recent sovereign debt negotiations, could impose a
huge cost to investors.
Both Roubini and Setser (2004) and Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer (2007)
provide evidence that sovereign bond restructurings involve costly delay and
argue that delay in sovereign debt restructuring negotiations or lengthy debt
renegotiation is widely regarded as ine¢ cient since the sovereign debtor usu-
ally su¤ers from losing access to the international nancial market while the
creditors cannot realize their investment gains. Table 1 summarizes data
from both these papers and provides suggestive evidence that in a number
of recent episodes of sovereign debt restructurings, delay length and the size
of haircuts are positively correlated.
Sovereign
State
Restructuring
negotiations
Default?
Delay
- after default
Face
value
Haircut
Russia
11/1998-7/2000
20 months
Yes
1/1999
18 months $29.1 69%
Ukraine
1/2000-4/2000
3 months
Yes 3 months $2.6 40%
Pakistan
2/1999-12/1999
10 months
No  $0.6 30%
Ecuador
8/1999-8/2000
12 months
Yes 12 months $6.5 60%
Argentina
9/2003-4/2005
19 months
Yes
12/2001
40 months $79.7 67%
Uruguay
4/2003-5/2003
1 month
No  $3.8 26%
Table 1: Sovereign Debt Restructurings during 1998-2005
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Source: Table 14 and 15 in Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer (2005); Table A.3 in
Roubini and Setser (2004)
Why is it so di¢ cult for sovereign debtor and creditors to restructure
sovereign debts in an orderly and timely manner? Will faster and more
orderly debt restructuring not only help in restoring economic momentum
but also reducing the probability of which a crisis occurs in the rst place?
From a theoretical perspective, a single creditor, complete information
bargaining model of sovereign debt restructuring (for examples, Bulow and
Rogo¤ (1989) and Bhattacharya and Detragiache (1994)) cannot account for
delay since, in this class of models, an immediate agreement occurs along
the equilibrium path of play. When the size of bargaining surplus is deter-
ministic, the defaulting country and its creditors know exactly the future
bargaining surplus; thus, both bargaining parties can reach an agreement
immediately after the default.
In this paper, our starting point is the assumption that both the recovery
process and the willingness to undertake massive scal cuts (by running a
primary budgetary surplus, for example) are uncertain. In a single creditor
model, we show that multi-period costly delay will exist in a Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium driven by the prospect of uncertain economic recovery and the
signalling of sustainability concerns.
In our model, the length of delay is positively correlated with the size of
creditor losses or haircuts. Although one-period delay occurs to permit for
economic recovery, multi-period delay is essential for the debtor to signal
sustainability concerns. Relative to the case with one-period delay, with
two-period delay, the creditor always receives lower payo¤s, which leads
to larger haircuts although the debtor could either gain or lose. When the
debtor gains from two-period delay, conditional on default, the two scenarios
cannot be interim1 Pareto ranked. However, when the debtor loses from two-
period delay, one-period delay interim Pareto dominates two-period delay
conditional on default. We use data from Benjamin and Wright (2009)
to provide evidence on the positive correlation between delay length and
haircuts.
1At the interim stage, payo¤s are computed conditional on default but before all un-
certainty related to the size of the bargaining surplus and the sustainability concern is
resolved.
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Finally, we introduce ex ante debtor moral hazard so that the proba-
bility of default is endogenous. We examine the impact of delay in debt
restructuring negotiation on the probability of default. We show that the
ex ante Pareto ranking of the equilibria with one-period and two-period
delay could be di¤erent from their interim Pareto ranking of equilibria con-
ditional on default. We then examine some policy interventions that have
been advocated to ensure more orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next subsec-
tion presents a review of related literature. Section 2 presents the model and
the results. Section 3 is devoted for presenting some supporting evidence.
Section 4 is devoted for discussing the issues related to ex ante sovereign
debtors incentive. Section 5 presents some policy recommendations, while
Section 6 concludes. The proofs and computations underlying some expres-
sions in the main body of the paper are contained in the appendix.
1.1 Related Literature
Our result that there could be multi-period delay in a single-creditor model
is complementary to a number of other papers that seek to explain delay
in debt restructuring. Some scholars highlight the holdout problem or col-
lective action problem among creditors, whereby an individual creditor is
better o¤ if he gets paid in full, while other creditors bear the burden of
debt restructuring2. In Pitchford and Wright (2007), delays in debt restruc-
turing negotiation arise from creditor holdout and free-riding on negotiation
e¤ort. In another class of models, costly debt restructuring arises from im-
perfect creditor coordination with multiple creditors (Kletzer, 2002; Ghosal
and Miller, 2003; Haldane et al., 2004; Weinschelbaum and Wynne, 2005;
Ghosal and Thampanishvong, 2009), whereby conditional on default, the
lack of creditor coordination leads to an ine¢ cient outcome.
Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998) show that immediate settlement can be
socially suboptimal. Sturzenegger (2002) argues that default usually results
in large output losses so that delaying settlement could benet both the
2According to Roubini and Setser (2004), the New York law sovereign bond contracts
give each individual bondholder the right to initiate litigation and allow each bondholder
to keep for himself anything that he recovers from the sovereign. Roubini and Setser also
pointed out that, in case of Argentina, it has to restructure 98 international bonds held
by a diverse group of investors, including international institutional investors, domestic
pension funds, and hundreds of thousands of retail investors.
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debtor and the creditor. Dhillon et al. (2006) examine the Argentine debt
swap in 2005 to see whether bargaining theory in the spirit of Merlo and
Wilson (1998) can help explain the Argentine nal debt settlement as well
as the delay in achieving settlement. Based on a dynamic model of sovereign
default in which debt renegotiation is modelled as a stochastic bargaining
game along the lines of Merlo and Wilson (1995), Bi (2008) nds that delay
is benecial as it permits the debtor countrys economy to recover from a
crisis. Multi-period delay can arise in Bi (2008) but delay length could be
negatively correlated with haircut size.
In a related vein, Benjamin and Wright (2009) analyze the impact of
uncertainty on the renegotiation length. Specically, the debtor and the
creditor nd it privately optimal to delay restructuring until future default
risk (i.e. risk that the debtor will default on the settlement agreement) is
low, even though delay means some gains from trade remain unexploited.
Bai and Zhang (2009) study another sovereign debt negotiation game
with private information about creditor reservation values. The government
uses costly delay as a screening device for the creditorstype so delay arises in
the equilibrium. The length of delay positively correlates with the severity of
private information and could negatively correlate with haircut size although
they show that the presence of a secondary market on sovereign debt could
reduce delay length.
2 The Model and the Results
2.1 The bargaining model environment
In this section, we consider a sovereign debtor who is already in default.
Conditional on default, there is a bargaining between the sovereign debtor
and the creditor to restructure the defaulted sovereign debts. We refer to
the bargaining surplus as the additional tax revenue generated to the sov-
ereign debtor by gaining access to the international capital market once the
outstanding debt has been successfully restructured3. We suppose that the
3 In Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), while in default, the debtor cannot access the inter-
national capital market to borrow for consumption smoothing. Bi (2008) assumes that,
after a default, the sovereign debtor has no access to outside nancing and the length of
exclusion from international capital market depends on the renegotiation process. The
sovereign debtor needs to repay its defaulted debt in order to regain access to the capital
markets.
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sovereign debtor uses the tax revenue for one of the two reasons: spending on
public good or debt repayment. Thus, debt repayment requires a diversion
of funds away from expenditure on public good. We interpret the debtors
o¤er to the creditor in the debt restructuring negotiation as the amount of
tax revenue diverted from provision of public good. The total tax revenue
available for bargaining is represented by , where  > 0.
Since we begin our analysis in this section at a point in which the debtor
is in default, we assume that the value of  in the period immediately after
default the initial period is low and is denoted by L. This assumption
is along the lines of the argument put forward by Sturzenegger (2002), that
is default is associated with large collapse in the economys output thus,
following a default, few resources are available in the debtor country for
debt repayment. We, however, allow the future value of  to be stochastic
so that, in the subsequent periods,  can continue to be low at L with
probability p or grow to a higher level, H , with probability 1 p. A growing
 can be interpreted as an increase in the tax revenue. It is important to
highlight that, if a debt settlement occurs immediately after a default, i.e.
in the initial period, in which the bargaining surplus, L, needs to be shared
between the sovereign debtor and the creditor, the cake to be allocated
is small and doing so could mean both parties choose to give up on the
prospect of economic growth.
As in Dhillon et al. (2006), during the debt restructuring negotiation,
the sovereign debtor could have a strategy for reducing the debt vulnera-
bility such as the running of scal surpluses to reduce the remaining debt
service. Such sustainability constraint essentially restricts the amount avail-
able for creditor in the debt negotiation, particularly when the economy of
the debtor country is in a recession following a default. In this paper, the
debtors sustainability constraint is represented by s, and it denotes the min-
imum fraction of the tax revenue required by the debtor which is consistent
with economic and political stability of the debtor country. To simplify our
analysis, we assume that there are two types of debtor, Optimistic and Cau-
tious, and the debtors type is determined by the sustainability constraint.
For the Optimistic debtor, s is close to zero, while the Cautious debtors
sustainability constraint, s, is close to a level s > 0.4
4 In the case of Argentina, even after economic recovery, the ratio of the sustainability
to the bargaining surplus, s=, is 55 percent (Dhillon et al., 2006).
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The Optimistic and the Cautious debtors di¤er in the utility they obtain
from consuming their part of the bargaining surplus. While the utility of
the Cautious debtor is linear in her share of the bargaining surplus, for the
Cautious debtor, there is a discontinuity in the utility at a threshold settle-
ment level, s, to reect her sustainability concern on the debt settlement.
Formally, let ui denotes the utility of type-i debtor, where i = Optimistic
(O), Cautious (C), and let i denotes the type-i debtors share of the bar-
gaining surplus. It follows that, for the Optimistic debtor, uO = O for all
values of O, while for the Cautious debtor,
uC =
(
0 for C < s
C for C  s
:
In this paper, we capture the debtors concern on sustainability of debt
settlement by assuming the piecewise linearity of preferences. By doing so,
it rules out default as a mechanism for risk sharing, which would likely a¤ect
welfare computations.
We assume that there is an asymmetric information about the sustain-
ability constraint. The creditors prior probability over f0; sg is fq0; 1  q0g.
We assume that the uncertainty with respect to  and with respect to the
sustainability constraint are resolved at t = 2.
In our model, bargaining takes place over a number of time periods,
t = 1; 2; 3; ::: The bargaining game is specied as follows. We assume that
the debtor makes an o¤er at t = 1, but, in the subsequent periods, the
debtor and the creditor have an equal probability of making an o¤er. An
o¤er is a number greater than or equal to zero and less than or equal to . If
the o¤er is accepted, then the sovereign debtor repays the creditor according
to the agreement and the game ends; otherwise, both players enter the next
period. This process continues until the o¤er is accepted. In any period
in which there is disagreement, the debtor is excluded from having access
to the international capital market, which is translated into an assumption
that the disagreement payo¤s for both players are zero.
The timing of events is summarized in Table 2.
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Size of  Debtors type Proposer Outcome
t = 1 L Debtor makes an o¤er
If o¤er is accepted,
game ends.
If o¤er is rejected,
game continues:
t = 2
Uncertainty
over 
is resolved.
Sustainability
constraint
is revealed to
the debtor.
Debtor and creditor
make o¤ers
with prob.
 
1
2 ;
1
2

If o¤er is accepted,
game ends.
If o¤er is rejected,
game continues:
t = 3; :::
Debtor and creditor
make o¤ers
with prob.
 
1
2 ;
1
2

If o¤er is accepted,
game ends.
If o¤er is rejected,
game continues.
Table 2: Timing of Events
We solve for the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the model. We assume
that both creditor and sovereign debtor have a common discount factor
 = (1 + r) 1, where  < 1 and r is the interest rate charged on sovereign
debt.
In order to distinguish between one-period and two-period delay, we con-
sider two cases: (Case 1) stochastic bargaining surplus but there is complete
information about sustainability constraint and the debtors type, and (Case
2) stochastic bargaining surplus and there is asymmetric information about
the sustainability constraint and the debtors type.
2.1.1 Case 1: Stochastic bargaining surplus and complete infor-
mation about the debtors type
In this case, the debtors type is known at t = 2 so the creditor knows
whether the debtor is Optimistic or Cautious. We begin our analysis at
t = 2. We compute the debtors and the creditors second-period payo¤s
when the debtor is Optimistic and Cautious, respectively. We then calculate
the continuation values for each player as we move backward to the rst
period. The continuation value would limit the o¤ers that can be made by
the debtor at t = 1, when the debtor is a proposer. To capture the point
that, at t = 2, the size of bargaining surplus is stochastic, we suppose that
E denotes the expected size of tax revenue, where E = pL + (1  p)H .
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Delay occurs at t = 1 if the debtors best o¤er, which is the excess
of the available bargaining surplus at t = 1, L, over the debtors own
continuation value, falls below the creditors continuation value. We show
that, when the bargaining surplus is stochastic and there is a complete
information about the debtors type, delay occurs whenever the expected
growth rate of the economy, Eg = (E L)L , exceeds the rate of discount,
r = 1  , regardless of the debtors type, i.e. r < Eg. This condition for
one-period delay is essentially the same as that in Merlo and Wilson (1998).
Our model predicts that, with relatively low growth prospects, there will be
an immediate agreement between the debtor and the creditor.
We summarize the above discussion as the following proposition:
Proposition 1 When the debtors type is known but there is an uncertainty
with respect to , there is one-period delay in sovereign debt restructuring
whenever the expected growth of the economy exceeds the rate of discount.
Proof. See Appendix A.
2.1.2 Case 2: Stochastic bargaining surplus and asymmetric in-
formation about the debtors type
In this subsection, we consider the case in which the bargaining surplus can
change over time in a stochastic manner and there is asymmetric information
about the debtors type. We solve the model by backward induction, starting
from period t = 3. At t = 3, the creditors posterior beliefs over the two
types of debtor is denoted by q1. Table 3 presents the creditors o¤ers at
extreme values of q1 and the creditors payo¤5.
Creditors belief
as to debtors type
Creditors o¤er Creditors Payo¤
q1 = 1
(Optimist)

2    2
q1 = 0
(Cautious)
( s)
2 (   s)  ( s)2
Table 3: Creditors o¤ers with extreme beliefs
5The detailed computations of creditors o¤ers and payo¤s are presented in Appendix
A.
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For less extreme beliefs, 0 < q1 < 1, the creditors expected payo¤
from a high o¤er of ( s)2 , which is acceptable to both types of debtor,
is
 
2 
2

(   s), while the creditors expected payo¤ from a low o¤er of

2 , which is only acceptable to the Optimistic debtor is q1
 
   2

. If
q1
 
   2

>
 
2 
2

(   s), the creditor will do better by making a low
o¤er but otherwise for q1
 
   2

<
 
2 
2

(   s). When q1
 
   2

= 
2 
2

(   s), the two o¤ers give the creditor the same expected payo¤.
This condition implies that the posterior belief of the creditor is q1 =  s .
Since 0 < s < , it follows that q1 < 1. We assume that, if the creditor is
indi¤erent between a low and a high o¤er, he will choose to make a high o¤er.
Table 4 shows the creditors o¤ers at t = 3 as a function of his posterior
belief.
Creditors belief
as to debtors type
Creditors o¤er
Expected payo¤
for creditor
q1 >
 s

(Probably an Optimist)

2 q1
 
   2

q1   s
(Probably Cautious)
( s)
2
 
2 
2

(   s)
Table 4: Creditors o¤ers at t = 3 for all values of belief
If, however, the debtor is the proposer, the Optimistic debtors o¤er is

2 , while the Cautious debtors o¤er is
( s)
2 , which are the corresponding
continuation values of the creditor as computed in Appendix A.
Moving to the second period, the continuation values for the debtor and
the creditor, given the common discount factor, , and the fact that each
negotiating party has an equal probability of being a proposer, are presented
in Table 5.6
Creditors belief
as to debtors type
Continuation
values for debtor
Continuation
values for creditor
q1 >
 s

(Probably an Optimist)

2

2

q1
 
2 
2

 + 2

q1   s
(Probably Cautious)
(+s)
2
( s)
2
6 In Table 5, when q1 ! 1, the creditors continuation value approaches 2 , which is
the same as in the case with complete information about the debtors type.
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Table 5: Continuation values for the debtor and the creditor at t = 2
At t = 2, there is an asymmetric information about the debtors type.
Let us x the creditors posterior belief, q1, so that the creditors contin-
uation values are as given in Table 5. We denote such continuation belief
by q01, where q01   s . Corresponding to such continuation belief of the
creditor, the debtors and the creditors continuation values are given by
(+s)
2 and
( s)
2 , respectively. In what follows, we show that delay in the
second period is necessary for the debtor to signal about her type and the
sustainability concerns.
Lemma 1 Delay occurs in the second period of the bargaining game when-
ever the creditors prior belief that the debtor is Optimistic, q0, is su¢ ciently
high, i.e. q0 >  s , or when the sustainability concern is su¢ ciently impor-
tant, i.e. s > (1  q0).
Proof. See Appendix A
The details of the mixed strategy at t = 2 are as follows: if the debtor
is chosen to be a proposer, the Optimistic debtor o¤ers (~x2;    ~x2) with a
probability (1  ) and o¤ers (x02;    x02) with a probability , where ~x2 = 
2 
2

+ s2 , x
0
2 >
 
2 
2

+ s2 and 
 =
 
 s
s
 1 q0
q0

, while the Cautious
debtor o¤ers (x02;    x02) with a probability 1. The creditor rejects the o¤er
(~x2;    ~x2) with a probability (1  ) and rejects the o¤er (x02;    x02)
with a probability 1, where  = s
2(~x2  2 )
. If, instead, the creditor is chosen
to make an o¤er at t = 2, the creditor o¤ers (~x2;    ~x2). The Optimistic
debtor accepts such creditors o¤er with a probability , while the Cautious
debtor rejects the creditors o¤er with a probability 1.
Next, at t = 3, the creditors belief as to the debtors type is q1 =  s .
The creditors payo¤ at t = 3 is ( s)2 , while the debtors payo¤ depends on
the debtors o¤er at t = 2. If the debtors o¤er is (~x2;    ~x2), the debtors
payo¤ at t = 3 is 2 ; however, if the debtors o¤er at t = 2 is (x
0
2;    x02),
her payo¤ at t = 3 is (+s)2 .
We then move backwards to period t = 1 and calculate the continuation
values for the creditor and for the debtor. There are two scenarios to be
considered: (1) the debtor knows her own type and (2) the debtor does not
know her own type.
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If the debtor knows her own type, according to the detailed computa-
tions in Appendix B, the continuation value for the Optimistic debtor is

h
(+s)
4
i
, the continuation value for the Cautious debtor is 
h
(+s)
2
i
and
the continuation value for the creditor is


 (   s)
2

1 

   s
s

(1  q0)

+

   s
s

(1  q0)
 
   x02

:
On the other hand, if the debtor does not know her own type, again fol-
lowing the detailed computations in Appendix B, the debtors continuation
payo¤ is 
2(+s)
2

2 q0
2

, while the creditors continuation payo¤ is the same
as in the rst scenario.
From these two scenarios, it follows from the detailed computations in
Appendix B that the expected payo¤ for the creditor from rejecting the
debtors o¤er at t = 1, a^, is given by
a^ = 

 (E   s)
2
  (1  q0)

(E   s)
s

 (E   s)
2
  E + Ex02

;
where Ex02 > E   (E s)2 since x02 >    ( s)2 . An alternative inter-
pretation for a^ could be the minimum payo¤ for the creditor to accept the
debtors o¤er.
For delay to occur at t = 1, when the debtor is a proposer, it should
be attractive for the the creditor to reject the debtors best o¤er at t = 1.
This happens when the best o¤er of the debtor falls below the creditors
continuation payo¤ or the expected payo¤, a^, computed earlier.
Lemma 2 The condition for delay at t = 1 is
L   

 (E + s)
2

< a^;
i.e. the excess of the available bargaining surplus over the Cautious debtors
own continuation value falls below the creditors expected payo¤ in the rst
period.
Proof. In what follows, we derive the conditions for delay for each type
of debtor at t = 1. For the Optimistic debtor, the best o¤er that she can
make is the excess of the available bargaining surplus, L, over her own
continuation value, 

(E+s)
4

, i.e. L   

(E+s)
4

. If such o¤er falls
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below the expected payo¤ for the creditor, a^, the debtors o¤er will not be
accepted since the creditor does better by waiting until the next period. This
results in a delay in the rst period. Formally, the condition for rst-period
delay for the Optimistic debtor is given by
L   

 (E + s)
4

< a^: (1)
For the Cautious debtor, her best o¤er is L 

(E+s)
2

. If such o¤er falls
below a^, the o¤er will not be accepted. Formally, the condition for delay for
the Cautious debtor is
L   

 (E + s)
2

< a^: (2)
Clearly, when condition (2) is satised, condition (1) will also be satised.
Thus, the condition for delay in the rst-period is given by condition (2).
Therefore, in the case in which the bargaining surplus is stochastic and
there is an asymmetric information about the debtors type and the sustain-
ability concern, there is a semi-separating Perfect Bayesian equilibrium with
two-period delay along the equilibrium path of play, initially to permit for
economic recovery followed by signalling about the sustainability constraint
given that the conditions:
s

> (1  q0) or q0 >    s

and L   

 (E + s)
2

< a^
are satised.
Since 0 < q0 < 1,
 
E s
s

> 0 and Ex02 > E  (E s)2 , by computation,
it follows that a^ < E2 and a^ <
(E s)
2 . Therefore, the condition for rst-
period delay both for the Optimistic and Cautious debtor when there is an
asymmetric information about the debtors type, i.e. L   

(E+s)
4

< a^
and L 

(E+s)
2

< a^, respectively, are more stringent than the condition
for delay in the full information case, i.e. r < Eg. The reason is that, under
the former, there is a positive risk that the creditor would face a Cautious
debtor, which lowers the creditors continuation payo¤.
We summarize the above discussion as the following proposition:
Proposition 2 When there is an asymmetric information about the debtors
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type and a stochastic bargaining surplus, there exists a Perfect Bayesian equi-
librium with two-period delay.
2.2 Comparisons of payo¤s with one-period and two-period
delay
In what follows, we compare the creditors payo¤ in the case with one-
period delay and in the case with two-period delay in the mixed strategy
equilibrium. This would allow us to establish the correlation between delay
and size of haircuts in sovereign debts. Table 6 provides a summary for the
creditors continuation payo¤s from rejecting the debtors o¤er at t = 1 in
the case with one-period and two-period delay.
Debtors type
Creditors payo¤s
with one-period delay
Creditors payo¤s
with two-period delay
Optimistic debtor E2 a^
Cautious debtor (E s)2 a^
Table 6: Delay and haircuts in sovereign debt restructuring (in a mixed
strategy)
Basing on Table 6, for the creditors expected payo¤with one-period de-
lay to be greater than the expected payo¤ with two-period delay, it requires
that
q0

E
2

+ (1  q0)

 (E   s)
2

> a^:
Let Ex02 = E   (E s)2 + ", where " is a strictly positive number. By
computation, the above condition reduces to
q0

E
2

+(1  q0)

 (E   s)
2

   (E   s)
2
+ (1  q0)

E   s
s

> 0;
which is equivalent to
q0
 s
2

+ (1  q0)

E   s
s

> 0;
a condition which always holds.
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Thus, conditional on default, relative to one-period delay, the creditors
loss is higher under two-period delay so, in the mixed strategy equilibrium,
delay is positively correlated with haircut.
In order to undertake the Pareto ranking of equilibria, we need to com-
pute the debtors payo¤s with one-period and two-period delay. With two-
period delay, the debtors expected payo¤ is 
2(+s)
2

2 q0
2

, where the de-
tailed computation is contained in Appendix B. By computation, it follows
that the debtors expected payo¤ with two-period delay is greater than the
payo¤ with one-period delay if and only if:
s
E
>
2 (1  ) + q0
2 (1  ) + q0 (2  ) : (3)
The fraction on the RHS of the above inequality is decreasing in q0 but
increasing in , while the fraction on the LHS of the inequality is increas-
ing in s. Therefore, the debtors payo¤ with two-period delay is likely to
be higher than the payo¤ with one-period delay the higher is the ratio of
sustainability constraint to the expected value of the bargaining surplus,
the lower is the discount factor and the higher is the creditors prior that
the debtor is Optimistic. A possible intuition behind this condition could
be that, both when the discontinuity in the debtors payo¤s is at a higher
settlement value and when the creditor has a high prior that the debtor is
of an Optimistic type, the value of signalling about the debtors type and
the sustainability concerns is greater for the debtor.
By considering both the debtors and the creditors payo¤ conditional on
default with one-period and two-period delay, our results show that, relative
to one-period delay, two-period delay is interim Pareto dominated only when
the direction of the above inequality (3) is reversed since, in this case, both
the debtors and the creditors payo¤s are lower than with one-period delay.
Whenever the above inequality (3) holds, relative to one-period delay, the
debtor makes a payo¤ gain with two-period delay, while the creditor makes a
payo¤ loss. In this case, the two equilibria cannot be interim Pareto ranked.
We summarize the above discussion as the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Two-period delay never interim Pareto dominates one-period
delay although the reverse could be true.
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3 Empirical Evidence on Delay in Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Negotiation and Haircuts
In several studies on sovereign debt restructuring negotiations between a
sovereign debtor in default and the international creditors, there have been
some documentations that these negotiating parties have encountered some
di¢ culties in reaching mutually advantageous settlements as there is evi-
dence of both delay and haircuts. Roubini and Setser (2004) point out that
a number of the sovereign debt restructurings between 1998 and 2005 have
been largely characterized by protracted negotiations.
With regards to haircuts, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005) nd that
there are very large variations in the average level of haircuts across the
debt restructuring episodes of 1998 to 2005. The present value haircuts7,
according to their calculations, ranged from around 5 to 20 percent for
Uruguay (2003) to over 50 percent for Russia (2000) and over 70 percent
for Argentina (2005), with the remaining exchanges falling mostly in the
20 to 40 percent range. Roubini and Setser (2004) and Sturzenegger and
Zettelmeyer (2005) have been the two commonly used sources of data for
delay length (default dates and date of debt settlement) and estimates of
creditor losses or haircuts as cited by several papers including Dhillon et al.
(2006), Ghosal and Miller (2005), DErasmo (2007) and Bi (2008). In fact,
there exist small number of estimates of creditor losses produced by di¤er-
ent researchers, particularly World Bank (1993), Cline (1995), and Global
Committee Argentina Bondholders (2004).
A recent paper by Benjamin and Wright (2009) uncovered di¤erent es-
timates of haircuts in 27 defaults constructed by four di¤erent sources men-
tioned earlier using 5 di¤erent methods. Among these four sources, Ben-
jamin and Wright argue that Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005, 2007)
provide the most rigorous measurement for creditor losses, but the estimates
are only available for six default episodes. Drawn from a variety of sources,
the database on sovereign debt restructuring outcomes containing data on
the occurrence of default and settlement, the outcomes of negotiations as
well as measures of economic performance and indebtedness constructed
7The losses that defaults have inicted on creditors are largely based on the comparison
between the (remaining) payment stream that was originally promised to investors and
the payment stream associated with the restructured instrument, both discounted at a
common interest rate (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2007).
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Figure 1: Delay length and haircuts ( Source: Data on delay length and haircuts
are from Benjamin and Wright (2009) Table 15 in Appendix C)
by Benjamin and Wright (2009) covers 90 default episodes by 73 countries
during the period of 1989 to 2006.
Basing on the summary statistics they obtained, Benjamin and Wright
nd that the length of delay falls within the range of 7.4 to 7.6 years. Ben-
jamin and Wright also report that the average creditor experienced a haircut
of roughly 40 percent of the value of the debt. Last but not least, they nd
that there is an evidence that longer delay is associated with larger haircuts,
with a correlation between the length of the renegotiation process and the
size of haircut of 0.66. By using data on length of renegotiation process
and size of haircuts from Benjamin and Wright (2009), we present a scatter
plot, which shows a positive correlation between delay length and haircuts,
in Figure 1.
3.1 A case study of Argentina
Could Argentina be a case in point8? In what follows, we provide a discus-
sion on why Argentina could be an example of recent debt restructuring,
8Clearly, a key policy issue in the discussions surrounding the Argentinean debt re-
structuring is related to issues of debt restructuring. In what follows, we highlight this
aspect of the Argentinean experience. This is not because we do not think creditor coor-
dinator is not important in practice (see, for instance, Roubini and Setser (2004, p.298))
but to emphasize issues central to this paper, namely those of recovery and sustainability.
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following a default in 2001, which involves a substantial delay and large
haircuts. There were di¤erent factors that could explain why a restructur-
ing of Argentine sovereign debts involved a substantial delay. We begin by
considering the political factors that militated against early restructuring.
After a default on sovereign debt was declared at the end of 2001, there
was a problem of legitimacy as Argentina was being governed by an interim
administration led by President Duhalde. At that time, since the Argentine
economy was in a severe recession, the priority of the President was to en-
gineer recovery and not to pursue outstanding structural reforms, among
which debt resolution was the most important(Bruno, 2004, p.1620). Se-
rious e¤orts to restructure Argentine debt did not begin until the interim
administration was replaced in the elections of 2003, but the striking rate of
recovery of GDP during President Duhaldes administration suggests that
debt restructuring would have been postponed even if there had been no
problem of legitimacy(Dhillon et al., 2006).
It was in September 2003, at the meetings of the IMF and the World
Bank in Dubai, that the Argentine government led by President Kirchner
nally revealed its negotiating stance. The specic strategy for reducing
the debt exposure of the economy involved three principal commitments by
the Argentine government, namely to run a primary surplus of 3 percent of
GDP, to limit the cost of debt service, and to exempt the preferred cred-
itors from the debt restructuring. The three percent GDP ceiling on debt
service restricts the amount that is available for creditors in the debt swap,
particularly when GDP is low. Thus, the rst two commitments by the
government of Argentina e¤ectively determined the overall size of the debt
write-down. The third commitment, which requires paying full compensa-
tion to the preferred creditors9 meant there was little left for other private
creditors. Without taking account of past-due interest, these constraints left
an annual ow of only about a billion dollars on GDP valued at $137 billion
a Dubai residualof less than one percentage point of GDP for private
creditors holding debt with a face value of around $80 billion (Dhillon et al.,
2006).
The Dubai proposals articulated by the Argentine government were promptly
rejected by creditor groups. However, improvements o¤ered in the course of
9These included both international nancial institutions, such as the IMF, the World
Bank and the IADB, and domestic bondholders who had lent into arrears.
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2004 together with a decline in the global interest rates meant that a debt
swap was nally accepted by 76 percent of the creditors in 2005.
To summarize, in the case of Argentina, there were clearly two separate
phases leading up to the debt swap in 2005. In the rst phase, from end
of 2001 to mid-2003, the Argentine economy was recovering strongly from a
deep recession and there appeared to be a consensus between both parties to
await recovery a consensus reinforced by the political di¢ culties faced by
the Duhalde regime. As for the second phase, one could interpret the meagre
Dubai o¤er made by Argentina in September 2003 as driven by sustainability
concerns. In the context of our analysis, this low o¤er was designed to be
rejected by international creditors, leading to delay and a reappraisal of the
type of debtor is Argentina and nally to a settlement that respected these
sustainability concerns. It is interesting to take note of the close coincidence
of the nal debt swap with the sustainability requirement10 calculated by
the Argentine government11.
4 Debtors Ex Ante Incentives and E¢ ciency
In Section 2, we have seen that multi-period costly delay arises in a Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium driven by prospect of uncertain economic recovery and
signalling about the sustainability concerns. What are the implications of
delay on the sovereign debtors ex ante incentives? In order to answer this
question, we study a very simple model of ex ante debtor moral hazard and,
by endogenizing the probability of default, examine the impact of delay
on the probability of default, i.e. under what conditions would two-period
delay, relative to one-period delay, increase the probability of default?
10As already pointed out in Dhillon et al. (2006), the ratio of sustainability constraint
to the bargaining surplus, s=, for Argentina has a value of 55 percent, while the debt
swap itself is estimated to represent a payo¤ of about 53 percent.
11Anecdotal support for this interpretation is provided in Liascovich (2005, pp. 226-
227) in his biography of Mr. Lavagna, who was the Argentine Finance Minister at the
time. His writing on the low Dubai o¤er and the sustainability concerns lying behind it
is as follows: some time before the o¤er [at Dubai], Lavagna was already preparing the
eld: he realized that after the o¤er, there are going to be sad faces everywhere. And
indeed the rst reaction of the creditors was of rejection...But the Argentine o¤ensive was
not restricted to Dubai. [President] Kirchner in New York, one day after the o¤er, had
an interview with President George W. Bush, who said, Keep on negotiating rmly with
the creditors.And the Argentine President used the auditorium of UN General Assembly
to criticize the international nancial organizations for supporting debt reduction and
[promoting] growth. It is never been known to recover debts from the dead,he said in
his speech.
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We assume that the sovereign debtor issues a bond12 at t = 0, which
promises an interest coupon, r, in perpetuity. At t = 0, the sovereign debtor
has to choose the level of e¤ort13, e 2 [0; 1], at a cost (e), where 0(e) > 0
and 00(e) > 0, so that it is more costly for the debtor to exert high e¤ort
relative to low e¤ort. At the beginning of t = 1, the sovereign debtor faces
an adverse shock14 with probability h. Conditional on the adverse shock,
there is a default by sovereign debtor with probability 1   e due to a lack
of available funds to cover outstanding debt payments. This suggests that a
low e¤ort implies that the debtors economy is more likely to be vulnerable
to an adverse external shock.
The adverse shock occurs with a positive probability only at the be-
ginning of t = 1, and the probability of the adverse shock is zero in all
subsequent periods. In the absence of the adverse shock, the debtor con-
tinues to make any contracted repayments and obtains a continuation, non-
contractible payo¤15 (measured in t = 0 payo¤ units) of D > 0. The fact
that the debtors payo¤, D, is non-contractible means that D cannot be
attached by the private creditors in the settlement of their claims nor can
the sovereign debtor make a credible commitment to transfer such payo¤ to
the private creditors.
If there is a default, the payo¤ of the debtor is described as in Section 2
and will depend on whether there is one-period or two-period delay in the
restructuring of defaulted debts. As a function of the equilibrium prevailing
in the post-default debt restructuring game, let K denote the debtors ex-
pected payo¤ conditional on default, measured in t = 0 payo¤ units, where
K < D. The debtor faces the following maximization problem:
max
e2[0;1]
h [eD + (1  e)K] + (1  h)D   (e):
12 It is important to explicitly state that, in this model of ex ante debtor moral hazard,
since the debtor does not decide how much to borrow, there is no room for default to
improve risk sharing, and there is no intensive margin along which borrowing can be
adjusted to changes in the cost of borrowing.
13 In this context, high e¤ort could correspond to a situation where money is borrowed
and used to promote R&D in the export sector and low e¤ort could correspond to trans-
ferring borrowed money to local elites who are then free to put it in tax havens overseas
(see Ghosal and Miller (2003) for more examples of ex ante debtor moral hazard and other
relevant results).
14An example of such adverse shock could be a shock to world oil prices.
15Following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), we interpret this non-contractible payo¤ as
the benet at t = 1 of a future gain in national output when a debt crisis is prevented at
t = 1.
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The rst-order condition characterizing an interior solution is:
0(e) = h (D  K) :
Observe that, since 00(e) > 0, it follows that the optimal level of ex
ante e¤ort, e (and hence the probability of default, (1   e)) is increasing
(decreasing) in the probability of adverse shock, h, and the debtors non-
contractible payo¤, D, but is decreasing (increasing) in the expected payo¤,
conditional on default, for the debtor, K.
In the interim debt restructuring negotiation, conditional on default,
one has seen that whether or not the length of delay adversely impacts the
debtors payo¤ depends on whether or not condition (3) holds, i.e. whether
or not the debtors expected payo¤ with two-period delay is greater than
the payo¤ with one-period delay. When two-period delay gives the debtor
higher expected payo¤ than one-period delay in the interim debt negotiation
game, the debtors payo¤ conditional on default, K, with two-period delay
increases relative to the one-period delay, while the corresponding ex ante
choice of e¤ort of the debtor, e, goes down. It follows that, relative to one-
period delay, two-period delay increases the ex ante probability of default,
making the debt crises more likely in the rst place.
Sovereign spread, S, could be calculated by using the formula introduced
in Ghosal and Miller (2003) as follows:
S = z (1 R) ;
where z is the probability of default, and R is the recovery rate. Applying
this formula to the context of our analysis, the probability of default is
z = (1  e)h and the recovery rate, R, is inversely related to the creditor
loss or the size of the haircut. Whenever the two-period delay gives the
debtor higher expected payo¤ than the one-period delay in the interim debt
negotiation game (i.e. whenever condition (3) holds), it follows that, relative
to one-period delay, sovereign spread with two-period delay is higher since
both z is higher (as e is lower with two-period delay) and R is lower (as
the size of the haircut is higher with two-period delay). Although, when
condition (3) holds, the equilibrium payo¤s conditional on default with one-
period delay cannot be e¢ ciency ranked relative to the equilibrium payo¤s
with two-period delay since the debtor gains while the creditor loses, the ex
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ante payo¤s with two-period delay could be lower relative to with one-period
delay. Moreover, with an appropriate adjustment of the sovereign spread,
the ex ante creditors payo¤s will be una¤ected by the delay length.
Formally, let et (respectively, Kt) denote the e¤ort choice of the debtor
(respectively, the debtors expected payo¤s conditional on default) with de-
lay length t, where t = 1; 2. As long as (1  e1)K1 ' (1  e2)K2 and
h (e1   e2)D > (e1)  (e2), then the sovereign debtors payo¤s are higher
with one-period delay relative to two-period delay16.
By Proposition 3, relative to one-period delay, two-period delay is in-
e¢ cient whenever it gives the debtor lower expected payo¤ at the interim
period (conditional on default) than the one-period delay, i.e. when the di-
rection of the inequality in condition (3) is reversed, as in this case, both
the debtors and creditors payo¤s with two-period delay are lower than with
one-period delay. However, when the two-period delay gives the debtor lower
expected payo¤ at the interim stage (conditional on default) relative to the
one-period delay, with two-period delay, the debtors ex ante level of e¤ort,
e, is higher and the probability of default, (1  e)h, is lower than with
one-period delay. Even though, relative to one-period delay,the recovery
rate, R, is lower with two-period delay due to larger size of haircuts, the
creditors ex ante payo¤s will not be a¤ected as the sovereign spread will be
adjusted upwards. However, the debtors ex ante payo¤s could actually go
up as long as (1  e1)K1 ' (1  e2)K2 and h (e1   e2)D > (e1)   (e2).
Therefore, the ex ante Pareto ranking of equilibria with one-period delay
and two-period delay could be di¤erent from the interim Pareto ranking of
equilibria conditional on default.
We summarize the above discussion as the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The ex ante Pareto ranking of equilibria with one-period
delay and two-period delay could be di¤erent from the interim Pareto ranking
of equilibria.
5 Policy Discussion
Drawing on the results that we have obtained so far, in what follows, we
provide a brief evaluation of a number of policy initiatives that are in rela-
tion to the sovereign debt restructuring, abstracting away from the issue of
16The latter condition came from he1D   (e1) > he2D   (e2).
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creditor coordination but focusing on delay generated by uncertain economic
recovery and signalling about the sustainability concerns.
In principle, avoiding e¢ cient delay due to waiting for economic recov-
ery can be achieved by the state-contingent bond contracts17. With state-
contingent bond contract, since the debtor and the creditor agree ex ante
how to adjust payments if adverse shocks occur, there is, therefore, no need
for both parties to renegotiate the contracts ex post should a negative shock
takes place. Payments on sovereign debt would then be automatically ad-
justed upwards in good state (i.e. when output and economic growth are
high), and adjusted downwards in bad state (i.e. during an economic reces-
sion and low growth). However, there are some broad problems associated
with this type of debt contract. First, it is di¢ cult to specify all poten-
tial shocks and contingencies in the contract and, second, since this type
of contract provides sovereign debtor with insurance against specic contin-
gencies, it could adversely a¤ect the debtors incentives and results in the
problem of debtor moral hazard. These problems could perhaps explain why
state-contingent bond contracts could be illiquid.
Argentina did nally issue GDP-linked bonds as a part of the debt swap.
These bonds were initially greatly undervalued by the market at the time of
issue but have subsequently been priced much more favorably. Could this
be a good augury for future debt restructuring18?
In the model we propose in this paper, the IMF could help by providing
information. When the growth prospects are not common knowledge, for
example, the IMF could resolve uncertainty about the future growth. Like-
wise, when sustainability concerns are in dispute, the IMF could publish its
own best estimates, which should remove the need for a Cautious debtor to
use delay as a signal for sustainability consideration19.
Viewed from the perspective of our model, clearly both of these inter-
ventions directly address concerns relating to e¢ ciency of debt restructuring
conditional on default. However, their use could be limited by concerns relat-
ing to debtor moral hazard especially when the Pareto ranking of equilibria
17See Shiller (2003), Caballero (2003), Borensztein and Mauro (2002) and Roubini and
Setser (2004) for further discussion on state-contingent debt contracts.
18 In this paper, we however, consider a non-contingent debt contract; thus the delay in
the initial period is needed to permit the defaulted debtors economy to recover from the
recession and so that more resources could be available for debt settlement.
19Blustein (2005) provides discussion on the o¢ cial sustainability assessments of Ar-
gentina made by the IMF but kept condential.
23
is altered ex ante relative to their interim Pareto ranking conditional on
default.
Nevertheless, in some situations, namely those where debtor payo¤s are
lower in the case of one-period delay relative to two-period delay, the in-
formation role of the IMF could improve ex ante e¢ ciency. A potentially
serious challenge to carrying out this informational role is that the IMF faces
a conict of interest: as a senior creditor, it presumably has an incentive to
exaggerate sustainability requirements in favour of the debtor to minimize
other claims on the debtors resources. Would such induced compassion
for the debtors not be checked by its creditor-dominated Executive Board?
If not, this informational task could be delegated elsewhere, perhaps to the
Inter-American Development Bank for cases of Latin American debt restruc-
turing, for example. Moreover, conditional on default, the debtor may have
an incentive to manipulate the information available to, and subsequently
made public by, the IMF.
6 Conclusion
One of the striking aspects of the recent sovereign debt restructurings is
that, conditional on default, long delay is positively correlated with size of
haircut. In this paper, abstracting away from the issues of creditor coor-
dination, we develop a bargaining model to account for this, highlighting
the economic recovery and sustainability considerations as complementary
reasons for delay.
With stochastic bargaining surplus and asymmetric information about
the debtors sustainability concern, we show that multi-period costly delay
arises in a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, initially reecting economic recov-
ery followed by signalling about sustainability. A key result of the model
shows that prolonged delay is positively correlated with a large haircut.
This result is supported by empirical evidence. We, then, examine the ex
ante incentives of the sovereign debtor and nd that the Pareto ranking of
equilibria, conditional on default, can be altered once ex ante incentives are
taken into account. Finally, we use our results for examining a number of
policy proposals put forward to ensure an orderly restructuring of sovereign
debts. We argue that the IMF could help by providing information on fu-
ture growth prospect of the debtor country as well as publishing its best
24
estimates on the sovereign debtors debt sustainability.
Combining the reasons for delay examined in this paper with those driven
by creditor coordination and creditor moral hazard remains a topic for future
research.
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We begin at t = 2. First, let us consider the case in which the debtor is
Optimistic. Let xL and xO denote the payo¤s for the Optimistic debtor when
the creditor and the Optimistic debtor are the proposers, respectively and
let  xL and  xO denote the share of the available bargaining surplus for
the creditor when the creditor and the Optimistic debtor are the proposer,
respectively. Using the standard arguments20, to compute the payo¤s for
the creditor and the Optimistic debtor, the following two equations need to
be solved:
xL =

2
(xL + xO) ; (A1)
   xO = 
2
(   xL +    xO) ; (A2)
where  denotes the common discount factor. Equations (A1) and (A2) have
a unique solution, given by (xO; x

L):
xO =
2  
2
 and xL =

2
: (A3)
According to (A3), at t = 2, if the Optimistic debtor is a proposer, she
o¤ers  xO = 2 to the creditor and if it is the creditor who is the proposer,
the creditors o¤er is xL =

2 . Given that each negotiating party has an
equal probability of being the proposer, it follows that the expected payo¤s
for the Optimistic debtor and the creditor at t = 2 are given by
 

2 ;

2

,
respectively.
Next, we consider the case in which the debtor is Cautious. The Cautious
debtor has concern about the sustainability of any debt settlement. The
presence of such sustainability constraint reduces the amount of bargaining
surplus that is available for debt restructuring negotiation from  to    s.
Let ~xL and ~xC denote the payo¤s for the Cautious debtor when the creditor
and the Cautious debtor are the proposers, respectively, and let (   s)  
~xL and (   s)   ~xC be the share of the available bargaining surplus for
the creditor when the creditor and the Cautious debtor are the proposers,
respectively. Using the same logic as above, when the Cautious debtor is the
proposer, she always o¤er (   s)  ~xC = ( s)2 to the creditor, while, if the
20Such arguments are as follows. In the equilibrium, either party will agree to a debt
restructuring proposal if the proposal o¤ers the party at least as much in discounted
present value term as it can expect to attain by waiting until the next period, given the
strategies of both parties.
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creditor is the proposer, his o¤er is ~xL =
( s)
2 . With an equal probability
that each party is the proposer, the expected payo¤s for the Cautious debtor
and the creditor at t = 2 are
  
+s
2

;
 
 s
2

, respectively.
Next, we calculate the continuation values for each player as we move
to the rst period. Let E = pL + (1  p)H denote the expected size of
. If the debtor is Optimistic, the continuation values for the Optimistic
debtor and the creditor are
 
E
2 ;
E
2

, respectively. However, if the debtor
is Cautious, the continuation values for the Cautious debtor and the creditor
are

(E+s)
2 ;
(E s)
2

, respectively.
At t = 1, the sovereign debtor is a proposer. Let Eg denote the expected
growth of the economy, where Eg = (E L)L and r =
1 
 . In what follows,
we present the condition for one-period delay when the debtor is Optimistic
and Cautious, respectively.
For the Optimistic debtor, the best o¤er that she can make is the excess
of the available bargaining surplus over his own continuation value given by
L  E2 . If this o¤er falls below the creditors continuation value, E2 , this
o¤er will not be accepted. Formally, this condition for the rst-period delay
for the Optimistic debtor is given by
L   E
2
<
E
2
, r < Eg:
For the Cautious debtor, the best o¤er that she can make is L  (E+s)2 .
If this o¤er falls below the creditors continuation value, (E s)2 , this o¤er
will not be accepted. Formally, the condition for the rst-period delay for
the Cautious debtor is given by
L    (E + s)
2
<
 (E   s)
2
, r < Eg:
Therefore, for either type of sovereign debtor, with relatively low prospect
of economic growth, there will be no delay in the rst period and an imme-
diate agreement occurs. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1
We begin with the case in which the debtor is chosen to make an o¤er at
t = 2. Let (x2;    x2) denote the o¤er made by the debtor, where x2 and
   x2 are payo¤ for the debtor and the creditors share of the bargaining
surplus, respectively. Let ~x2 be the solution to    x2 = ( s)2 , where
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( s)
2 is the creditors continuation value. By computation, it follows that
~x2 =
 
2 
2

+ s2 . Let x
0
2 be any positive number such that  x02 < ( s)2 ,
where ~x2 < x02 < . It follows that x02 >
 
2 
2

 + s2 .
In a mixed strategy21, the Optimistic debtor may randomize between a
high o¤er   ~x2 and a low o¤er  x02. Suppose the Optimistic debtor o¤ers
(~x2;    ~x2) with a probability (1  ) and o¤ers (x02;    x02) with a proba-
bility , while the Cautious debtor o¤ers (x02;    x02) with a probability 1.
Recall that the creditors posterior belief at t = 3, is given by q1 =  s .
Updating the belief according to the Bayesian updating rule implies that, in
the equilibrium, the Optimistic debtor o¤ers (x02;    x02) with a probability
 such that q1 =
q0
q0+(1 q0) , where q0 is the creditors prior belief. It follows
that
q0
q0 + (1  q0) =
   s

: (A4)
Solving equation (A4) for  yields:
 =

   s
s

1  q0
q0

.
To ensure that  < 1, it requires that
   s
s

1  q0
q0

< 1, (1  q0) < s

, q0 >    s

: (A5)
Condition (A5) implies that, for a delay in the second period to exist,
the sustainability concern needs to be su¢ ciently important or the creditors
prior that the debtor is Optimistic is su¢ ciently high since, in these two
cases, the value of signalling is greater. As long as q0 >  s , there exists
 2 (0; 1) which solves equation (A4). For the creditor, by observing x02, it
follows that q1 =  s . Given q1 =
 s
 , the creditor is indi¤erent between
accepting (~x2;    ~x2) and rejecting it (and obtains his continuation value).
From condition (A5), we have q0 >  s . Let us denote the lower bound
for q0 by q =  s . It is obvious that q
0
1 < q. The creditor accepts (~x2;    ~x2)
with a probability  and rejects it with a probability (1  ). After observing
the o¤er (x02;    x02), the creditor rejects the debtors o¤er with a probability
1. The debtors expected payo¤ from an o¤er (~x2;    ~x2) is given by ~x2+
(1  )   2 , where 2 is the continuation value for the Optimistic debtor,
21See Spence (1974) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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while the debtors expected payo¤ from an o¤er (x02;    x02) is (+s)2 (with
a probability 1 since the creditor chooses to reject this o¤er with certainty),
which is the continuation value for the Cautious debtor. It follows that there
exists  2 (0; 1), which is a solution to the following equation:
~x2 + (1  )


2

=
 ( + s)
2
: (A6)
Solving equation (A6) for  yields:
 =
s
2
 
~x2   2
 :
Next, we consider the situation in which the creditor is chosen to be a
proposer at t = 2. Suppose that q0 >  s . The creditor o¤ers (~x2;    ~x2)
and the Optimistic debtor accepts the o¤er with a probability , while the
Cautious debtor rejects the creditors o¤er with a probability 1. Given the
preceding computations, it is clear that both types of debtor choose their
best-response and, given the debtors strategy, and given that the creditors
prior satises the condition q0 >  s , the creditor cannot do better either:
if the creditor makes an o¤er which gives him a payo¤ greater than    ~x2,
such o¤er would be rejected with probability 1 by both types of debtor.
Q.E.D.
Appendix B
Scenario 1: The debtor knows her own type
The continuation value for the Optimistic debtor is given by:


1
2
 
x02 + (1  ) ~x2

+
1
2


2

;
where the rst term refers to the debtors payo¤when she is the proposer at
t = 2, while the second term refers to the debtors payo¤ when the creditor
is a proposer at t = 2. Recall that an o¤er of (x02;    x02) from the debtor is
rejected by the creditor with a probability 1; therefore, the debtor obtains
a payo¤ of (+s)2 . However, if the debtor makes an o¤er (~x2;    ~x2), the
creditor accepts the debtors o¤er with a probability  and rejects the
debtors o¤er with a probability (1  ). It follows that the continuation
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value for the Optimistic debtor is

2



 ( + s)
2

+ (1  )

~x2 + (1  )


2

+

2

:
After a simplication, we nd that the Optimistic debtors continuation
value is given by 

(+s)
4

.
The continuation value for the Cautious debtor is 

(+s)
2

since, at
t = 2, the Cautious debtor o¤ers (x02;    x02) with a probability 1 and the
creditor rejects the debtors o¤er of (x02;    x02) with a probability 1.
Finally, the continuation value for the creditor is given by


q0
 

 
   x02

+ (1  ) (   ~x2)

+ (1  q0)

 (   s)
2

;
where the rst term refers to the creditors payo¤ if the debtor is Optimistic
and the second term refers to the creditors payo¤ if the debtor is Cautious.
After a simplication and a substitution of the term ~x2, we obtain:


 (   s)
2

1 

   s
s

(1  q0)

+

   s
s

(1  q0)
 
   x02

:
Scenario 2: The debtor does not know her own type
Under this scenario, the creditors continuation value is the same as in
Scenario 1, but the debtors continuation payo¤ is
q0

2

x02 + (1  ) ~x2 +

2

+ (1  q0) 

 ( + s)
2

;
which after substitution and simplication becomes
2 ( + s)
2

2  q0
2

:
In the rst period, the sovereign debtor is a proposer. It follows from the
two scenarios we considered above that the expected payo¤ for the creditor
from rejecting the debtors o¤er at t = 1, a^, is given by
a^ = 
0@ p hq0 ( (L   x02) + (1  ) (L   ~x2)) + (1  q0) (L s)2 i
+(1  p)
h
q0 (
 (H   x02) + (1  ) (H   ~x2)) + (1  q0)

(H s)
2
i 1A :
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After a simplication, we obtain:
a^ = 

 (E   s)
2
  (1  q0)

(E   s)
s

 (E   s)
2
  E + Ex02

;
where Ex02 > E   (E s)2 .
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